Pirmieji 400 naujojo "Chevrolet Volt" elektromobilio pirkėjų JAV gaus galimybę nemokamai namuose įsirengti "elektros degalinę" - firmos "ECOtality Inc." sukurtas 240 voltų įtampos įkrovimo stoteles. Jos leis
mašinos akumuliatorius įkrauti greituoju būdu.
"General Motors" pranešimu, šį stotelių projektą finansuoja JAV Energetikos departamentas. Remiantis sąlygomis, įkrovimo stoteles gaus tie "Volt" modelio pirkėjai, kurie gyvena miestuose, dalyvaujančiuose šalies transporto elektrifikavimo projekte, bei sutinka statistikos tikslais
dalintis informacija apie baterijų įkrovimą - kaip dažnai jie įkrauna akumuliatorius, kur ir pan.
Naudojant šiuos duomenis JAV bus pastatyta pirmosios 15 tūkstančių viešų elektromobilių įkrovimo "degalinių".
"Chevrolet Volt" galima įkrauti ir iš buitinio 120 voltų įtampos tinklo, tačiau tam reikia visos nakties - skirtingai nuo 3 valandų, kurių reikia įkrovimui iš 240 V tinklo.
或許自由意志的存有論問題很大 所以用一個模糊的概念來解釋另一個模糊的概念不見得是一件好事 但 如同你的相信 你相信愛 創意 自我 都可以有不依賴自由意志的定義 其實我或許沒有你那麼強烈的信心 但至少也同意這是一個可行的進路 然而 在我們準備要丟掉一個沉重的存有論包袱的時候 我的問題是 人類真的能夠這麼 輕鬆 地去適應另一套龐大的理論系統的改變嗎 如果說 為了道德責任對人類社會的重要性 或者根本性 即使放棄了我們現在普遍接受的自由意志理論 人類社會依然會繼續利用道德責任的概念運作下去 但這個 繼續運作 不會是一個無痛的過程 而且會是一個很痛的過程 尤其當這個轉變甚至必須擴大到其它領域例如愛 創意 自我 等等概念時 這是我提這些概念用意 回到存有論的包袱 自由意志的討論也不總是預設了一個存有學的立場 至少就我所閱讀的相容論立場 自由意志 被理解為一種 自主性 Free will as Autonomy)或者自我決定的能力 這個能力不要求傳統的 自由 as alternative poibisslities)觀 自然也沒有傳統上的包袱 以相容論的觀點來看自由意志 幾乎捨棄了傳統自由意志的形上學基礎 而是以日常生活對 自由 一詞的使用做概念上的分析 在這個分析底下 我個人認為它除了保有了 自由意志 這個存在已久的 名 之外 實質上可能與你企圖做的事情相去不遠 這到底算是拋棄自由意志還是保留自由意志 我還不知道該如何看待 或許傳統不相容論的自由意志有其存有學的包袱 但是後來的相容論立場還有這個包袱嗎 我想並沒有 不過這可能必須取決於 你認為的後者比較大的ontology指的是什麼吧 url=ieccnu[/url] [link=pmaicphrr[/link]
Open
Reading this makes my easier than taking candy from a baby.
Joselyn
That's a subtle way of thnkinig about it.
Kate
The foundational of OPR is that we are free and equal moral persons in the following sense: person is born the authority over any other. That is to say that no one has any “natural” duties to others that do not stand in need of justification. (Kevin)There are threes here: we are (a) free, (b) equal, and (c) moral persons. Each seems to be playing a big role in GG's story, but I am not yet clear what that role is. Much depends on what they mean, and I am not yet clear about that either. At later points I'll raise questions. For now let me query Kevin about his claim above. He and I encounter one another if foreign lands, far from any Members of the Public that we know or recognize. I kill him. That seems wrong. We have a duty not to kill someone intentionally a defeasible duty, of course (e.g., self-defense). I don't know what Kevin means by a natural duty, but this one does not seem to need a public justification. Hobbes and other moral conventionalists would disagree, but I wonder if Kevin
Kate
The foundational of OPR is that we are free and equal moral persons in the following sense: person is born the authority over any other. That is to say that no one has any “natural” duties to others that do not stand in need of justification. (Kevin)There are threes here: we are (a) free, (b) equal, and (c) moral persons. Each seems to be playing a big role in GG's story, but I am not yet clear what that role is. Much depends on what they mean, and I am not yet clear about that either. At later points I'll raise questions. For now let me query Kevin about his claim above. He and I encounter one another if foreign lands, far from any Members of the Public that we know or recognize. I kill him. That seems wrong. We have a duty not to kill someone intentionally a defeasible duty, of course (e.g., self-defense). I don't know what Kevin means by a natural duty, but this one does not seem to need a public justification. Hobbes and other moral conventionalists would disagree, but I wonder if Kevin
Khamar
nothing further to it. For example, many Christians and Gandhians begin from the idea that we have almost infinite obligations to love and advance the good of other people and a duty never to harm them by, for example, using force on them (because we are channels for God’s love or because we are not in any important way distinct from them and thus our good is the same as theirs). Oddly, some postmodernists (Connolly, Coles, Critchley) claim to find in Levinas, Nietzsche, or Adorno some similar set of duties. Cohen holds, in his Why Not Socialism?, that the central moral premise is that each ought to be interested in advancing everyone else’s good, as well as his or her own distinct good. Utilitarians, Aristotelians, etc. also have their own accounts of our basic moral situation. Beginning from these different starting points could lead to different conclusions about social morality (the authors concerned seem to think that it will) though, depending on how they are spelled out, it may not. Given that a
Leila
Hi Kevin, Thanks for getting this staetrd. I think I am one of those people who finds odd the idea that morality can be authoritarian (referred to on p.xvi). Of course the enforcement of morality and particularly of bad, so-called moralities' can be authoritarian. But morality as such? My as-of-yet quite vague worry came up in reading this para from your summary:The foundational assumption of OPR is that we are free and equal moral persons in the following sense: [no] person is born [with] the authority over any other. That is to say that no one has any “natural” duties to others that do not stand in need of justification. If we are equals, Gaus claims, we cannot simply order each other around. That would be to assert one’s authority over an equal without justification. It is because we are equals that we owe moral justifications to one another.From the modern, no natural authority thesis, it follows that no one has any natural duty to obey any one else. We are all born with duties to each other,